

Will History Repeat Itself?

Assessing the Implications of China's Regional Ambitions through the Lens of Imperial

Japan's Pacific Strategy

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## Introduction

December 7<sup>th</sup> 1941 was like any other Sunday on Oahu. Sailors from Pacific Fleet units moored at Pearl Harbor and airmen from the Army airfields at Wheeler, Hickam, and Bellows prepared for holiday routine under the bright tropical sun. At 0755, hundreds of Japanese planes broke the silence swooping in to bomb, torpedo, and strafe their assigned targets. Within minutes, Pearl Harbor was in flames with four battle ships sinking and over a dozen other ships badly damaged. The attacks destroyed over 160 aircraft and damaged nearly 100 others. As the third wave of attacking aircraft withdrew just before 1000, they left nearly 3000 Americans dead or injured.<sup>1</sup> Although the two carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet were not in port at the time of the attack, U.S. combat power in the region was reduced to critical levels within a two hour period.

The Commander of the Japanese strike force, VADM Chuichi Nagumo, had achieved a stunning victory at the cost of only 29 out of a strike force of 420 aircraft. As his six fleet carriers withdrew from their launch point about 250 miles northeast of Oahu, the Japanese military juggernaut set into motion a series of assaults that would eventually result in the fall of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. By early 1942, the military has achieved nearly all of its operational objectives, establishing a defensive perimeter around Japan that extended from Dutch Island in the Aleutian Islands to Singapore.<sup>2</sup> On December 8<sup>th</sup> 1941, Congress declared war on Japan and the other Axis powers, precipitating a bitter struggle that would last over four years and cost the United States over 405,000 dead and nearly 670,000 wounded.<sup>3</sup> Of these casualties, the

Pacific War with Japan resulted in over 95,000 dead or missing and about 200,000 wounded.<sup>4</sup>

Imagine if the United States had correctly assessed the indicators of the coming war in the Pacific and taken effective action to deter Imperial Japan's aggression – hundreds of thousands of casualties and billions of dollars in damage might have been averted. History may have given Washington a second chance. There are indicators of another coming war in the Pacific – a war that China's aggressive regional ambitions could precipitate. There will doubtless be some - perhaps many - who would dismiss such a scenario as misguided musings, unsupported by the political, economic, and military realities of either today or tomorrow. Such a perspective ignores the storm clouds that have been growing for nearly a decade, in much the same way that many ignored the threat posed by Japan during the run up to the Pacific War. In 2005, Robert Kaplan wrote:

For some time now no navy or air force has posed a threat to the United States. Our only competition has been armies, whether conventional forces or guerrilla insurgencies. This will soon change. The Chinese navy is poised to push out into the Pacific—and when it does, it will very quickly encounter a U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland. It's not hard to imagine the result: a replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls that were last in the news when the Marines stormed them in World War II.<sup>5</sup>

Kaplan's comments suggest that history may be repeating itself as China pursues a maritime strategy that is remarkably similar to that developed by Imperial Japan prior to World War II. Like Imperial Japan, today's China is dependent on the flow of critical resources from distant markets in order to sustain economic growth and support national development. Chinese leaders have developed a strategy that focuses heavily on maritime trade and the development of a navy capable of protecting vital sea

lanes of communication similar to Imperial Japan's regional strategy.<sup>6</sup> With such a strategy comes the imperative for a strong navy capable of deterring and if necessary defeating challenges from other maritime nations. Imperial Japanese leaders saw the United States as the only nation capable of credibly threatening such aspirations and Japanese leadership and war plans, forces and tactics were focused on neutralizing the United States Navy and its overseas bases.<sup>7</sup> Contemporary writings suggest that Chinese leaders have come to a similar conclusion and modernized and built up a military capable of holding U.S. forces in the Pacific at risk.<sup>8</sup>

In recent years, leaders in Washington and Beijing have pledged to pursue an improved relationship, cooperation on global issues and constructive engagement.<sup>9</sup> Such developments are welcome, but should be assessed in the context that Japan was seeking to avoid a conflict with the United States up to the last few weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.<sup>10</sup> Trompf (1981) and other scholars have argued that historic events can occur in repetitive cycles.<sup>11</sup> This paper accepts such a premise as axiomatic – history can and will repeat itself; and much can be learned from studying the past. In an effort to learn from the past, this paper will compare and contrast the strategies and associated military modernization and buildup of pre-World War II Japan and contemporary China. While such a comparison offers no promise of certainty, it nonetheless provides insights that may guide prudent preparations for the future.

### Japan's Pre-war Strategy

Mahan's concepts of sea power – that great power status is dependent on the attainment of international commerce enabled by a large merchant fleet, a strong navy,

and forward basing – deeply influenced Japanese strategists throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, although Japan’s military was dominated by Army Officers, Tokyo’s over-arching grand strategy focused heavily on the maritime domain.<sup>13</sup> The *end state* for this grand strategy was to assure Japan’s role as a major Asian Power and peripherally to offset U.S. regional influence. The primary *ways* supporting this end state were the attainment of the “lebensraum” and the autarky necessary for national development.<sup>14</sup> Colonial expansion into East Asia, specifically Manchuria and China and the establishment of a defensive perimeter across the Pacific islands was to provide the required “lebensraum”; an aggressive policy strongly influenced by Army leadership and growing nationalism. Morton (1989) notes:

The impulse to expansion and domination ... had its roots deep in Japanese tradition, patriotism, and economic necessity; its strongest support came from the militarists and extreme nationalists. In marked contrast to the position of the armed forces in democratic countries, the Army in Japan had a tradition of political leadership and enjoyed a position high in the esteem of the people. It was not, as in the United States and Great Britain, the servant of the government, controlled through responsible civil officials and by the power of appropriation.<sup>15</sup>

Protection of the sea lanes of communication associated with the flow of critical resources was to provide the autarky required for national development and prosperity. These resources included oil, tin, and rubber from Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies.<sup>16</sup> Of these resources, petroleum was particularly critical for Japan’s survival – by 1930, nearly 90% of Japan’s oil was imported and of this nearly 80% came from the United States.<sup>17</sup> Naval presence, forward basing, and ultimately colonial conquest were the *means* integral to such a strategy, a strategy that brought Japan on a collision course with the only Pacific Power that could conceivably disrupt its ambitions – the United States. While Japanese Army expansion was focused on colonial conquest, the Navy’s

modernization was focused on addressing the threat posed by the United States Navy and U.S. forward bases.

### Japan's Military Modernization and Buildup

Japan's war machine was supported by a budget that exceeded 75% of total government expenditures in 1938 and a rapidly expanding industrial base.<sup>18</sup> Pre-war Japan's economic statistics are impressive:

In the decade 1930-40, industrial production in Japan increased at a phenomenal rate. In the opening year of the decade, Japanese industrial output was valued at six billion yen and the emphasis was on the light industries; by 1941 production had increased fivefold and heavy industry constituted 72.7 percent of the total.<sup>19</sup>

This increase in heavy industry provided Japan with the capacity to substantially increase production of combat vehicles and aircraft. During the ten year period from 1930 to 1940, annual production of combat vehicles increased from 500 to 48,000 and the production of aircraft from 400 to 5,000.<sup>20</sup> Among these aircraft was the Mitsubishi A6M – or “Zero” as it was known by western analysts – at the time, the best fighter aircraft in the world.<sup>21</sup> Production in the maritime industry was equally impressive. During this period, naval combatant construction approached 500,000 tons and merchant ship construction increased from 92,093 tons in 1931 to 405,195 tons in 1937.<sup>22</sup>

Japan lacked the economic resources to compete militarily with the U.S. on a one-for-one basis; and Tokyo's shipbuilding program was also restricted – at least in principle – by the Washington Treaty (1922) which limited the total amount of tonnage that could be constructed.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, the shipbuilding program during the period of 1920-1941 was characterized by an emphasis on speed and firepower to offset the difference in total

tonnage between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Japanese naval leaders focused on the development of what today would be termed “asymmetric capabilities” and tactics to offset the U.S. advantage. Japan’s version of “non-contact warfare” included development of the world’s most advanced carrier aviation strike force, a fleet of world-class surface ships with armament that included stand-off “Long Lance” torpedoes, and a supporting land-based air arm capable of conducting deep strikes against naval targets.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, the Japanese Navy developed an extraordinary level of tactical proficiency – including the ability to conduct coordinated attacks at night – a critical war fighting skill largely overlooked by the U.S. and other western navies.<sup>26</sup>

### China’s Regional Strategy

Mahan’s concepts have also strongly influenced China’s development of a regional strategy.<sup>27</sup> Although China has long been a continental power, leadership understands that continued national development is largely dependent on maritime access to the resources available in overseas markets and China’s unprecedented buildup of its Navy underscores the maritime nature of Beijing’s regional strategy.<sup>28</sup> The *end state* of this strategy is to attain a strong, prosperous and modern China.<sup>29</sup> The primary *ways* – or “core interests” as the Chinese call them - that support the attainment of this end state are to safeguard the basic system and national security, to maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to sustain a stable economic and social development.<sup>30</sup> Implicit in such a strategy is China’s return to “great power status” by maintaining rapid economic development, reestablishing sovereignty over disputed areas – including Taiwan; the Senkakus and the “Cow’s Tongue” of the South China Sea; and ultimately replacing the United States as the preeminent power in Asia.<sup>31</sup> In short, Beijing seeks the autarky

needed to promote continued economic development and the “lebensraum” needed to support national defense.

Nearly 90% of China’s trade and resources are supplied by sea, and Beijing imports about 80% of its petroleum from the Middle East.<sup>32</sup> Accordingly, Chinese military strategists view a strong Navy as increasingly critical ways to safeguard the resources within China’s maritime littoral and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of goods and services from distant markets.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, sea power is viewed as an enabler for asserting China’s sovereign claims over disputed territories – a view consistent with growing nationalism within China and a more confident and assertive People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Lai (2009) notes:

At the strategic level, China has raised the stakes of its need for great maritime power as a precondition for its becoming a full-fledged global power. The Chinese argue that all global powers are also strong maritime powers...China must have a navy commensurate with its growing national power.<sup>34</sup>

China’s economic development over the last 20 years has been impressive by any standard. Capitalizing on consistent double-digit growth, China now boasts the world’s second largest economy. Ranked 12<sup>th</sup> in the world in growth, China’s manufacturing industry accounts for about 47% of its Gross Domestic Product.<sup>35</sup> China now ranks third in the world in heavy truck production, 2<sup>nd</sup> in the world in light commercial vehicle construction, and third in the world in machinery and transport equipment production.<sup>36</sup> China’s fledgling commercial aviation industry – presently heavily dependent on foreign imports – is forecasted to seize a significant regional market share within the next five to ten years.<sup>37</sup> Nowhere has development been as marked as in the maritime industry where China now has the world’s fourth largest merchant fleet, the third largest shipbuilding industry, and runs five out of the world’s top ten busiest container ports.<sup>38</sup>

China's defense industry sector has shown similar growth. Long dependent on Russian military technology, China has become increasingly capable of producing sophisticated weapons systems, sensors, and platforms, including multi-mission stealth aircraft, surface combatants with standoff surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems, stealthy diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion and super-sonic cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting both fixed installations ashore and maritime units. The Annual Report to Congress on China's Military Power (2010) notes:

China's leaders can draw from a diverse range of sources to support PLA modernization, including: domestic defense investments, indigenous defense industrial development, a growing research and development and science and technology base, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition... Beijing's long term goal is to create a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector, augmented by a strong commercial sector, to meet the needs of PLA modernization.<sup>39</sup>

### China's Naval Modernization and Buildup

Beijing has leveraged strong economic growth to support the extensive modernization and buildup of China's military forces. Lack of transparency makes precise estimates of the PLA's budget problematic; however, conventional wisdom suggests that Beijing's actual defense expenditures may be significantly higher than Beijing's official numbers. What is clear is that the PLA's budget has enjoyed steady growth – Erickson and Liff (2011) note:

At 12.7 percent, the increase in the 2011 budget represents a return to double-digit spending increases after a one-year hiatus and continues a nearly 25-year trend of rapid growth. Annual defense budget increases averaged 15.9 percent from 1998-2007, 14.5 percent from 1988-1997, and 3.5 percent from 1978-1987. Over the past 10 years, the official budget has increased by roughly 3.6 times (from 166 billion RMB in 2002 to 601 billion RMB today).<sup>40</sup>

China's military expenditures as a function of total government spending will be about 8% in 2011.<sup>41</sup>

The PLA has put these expenditures to good use, retiring obsolete units and introducing large numbers of sophisticated weapon and sensor systems across land, air, sea and space domains. The power projection capability of these units as well as their sheer numbers calls into question Beijing's consistent assertion that China's military strategy is defensive in nature. Indeed, The Annual Report to Congress on China's Military (2010) notes:

China is pursuing a variety of air, sea, undersea, space and counter-space, and information warfare systems and operational concepts ... moving toward an array of overlapping, multilayered *offensive* capabilities extending from China's coast into the western Pacific (Italics added for emphasis).<sup>42</sup>

Nowhere has this buildup of offensive capability been more profound than in the modernization of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA's supporting air and missile arms.

O'Rourke (2011) provides a sense of the scope and breath of this modernization program:

China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, and supporting C4ISR systems. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin (or already has begun) an indigenous aircraft carrier construction program.<sup>43</sup>

The scope of this modernization underscores the extent to which China's regional strategy focuses on the maritime domain. Indeed, the roles of the PLA Navy have been increased from coastal defense (defense of the "near sea") to a number of both defensive and offensive missions, including the development of an effective deterrent force through the deployment of ballistic missile submarines; development of strike capabilities

out to the “first island chain” from Japan down to the Philippines, Borneo, and South China Sea; supporting force projection operations in “distant seas”, and safeguarding maritime interests and sovereignty claims, including economic zones and sea lanes of communication.<sup>44</sup>

Chinese leaders understand that an assertive maritime strategy with expanding ambitions increases potential for a clash with other Pacific nations.<sup>45</sup> While potential adversaries include Russia, India, and Japan; Chinese strategists view the United States as the most likely – and most formidable – obstacle to China’s regional ambitions.<sup>46</sup> Recognizing that China will lack the capability for head-to-head combat with the United States for the foreseeable future, military planners have placed increasing emphasis on asymmetric war fighting approaches.<sup>47</sup> Such approaches include strikes with long range ballistic missiles and land-based aircraft, stand-off surface-to-surface missiles and stealthy submarines supported by sophisticated jamming and cyber-attacks intended to decisively neutralize U.S. maritime and forward-based forces. Nothing in PLA writings would preclude pre-emptive strikes on these forces, and in fact, PRC doctrine emphasizes seizing the initiative through first strike.<sup>48</sup>

A recent RAND study asserted that such tactics could allow the PLA to achieve its operational objectives in a Taiwan campaign *before* the United States could effectively intervene.<sup>49</sup> This study also noted the long-term implications of China’s growing anti-access capability:

Even if Chinese anti-access measures did not result in the outright defeat of the United States, they would likely make it significantly more costly for the United States to operate in the region, and these costs could even rise to the point at which the United States was unwilling to pay them. Finally, even if Chinese anti-access strategies did not result in the United States being unwilling or unable to defeat China, Chinese decision makers might convince themselves that they *would* cause the United States to be

unwilling or unable to intervene successfully. If the decision-makers then chose to take actions that would cause China to come into conflict with the United States, the result would be a costly and bloody war that would not otherwise have occurred.<sup>50</sup>

### Comparative Analysis - Similar End States, Ways, and Means

The similarities between Imperial Japan's and China's regional strategies and supporting military modernization and buildup are striking. The over-arching *end state* associated with each nation's strategy was the achievement of great power status and peripherally, displacement of the United States as the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific Region. The fundamental *ways* supporting this end state were attainment of economic self-sufficiency through distant market access and establishment of a stable periphery, either through colonial conquest in the case of Imperial Japan or coercive resolution of territorial disputes in the case of China.

Given the geographic relationship between each country's periphery, dependence on distant markets – particularly for petroleum products - and territorial aspirations, it should come as no surprise that both of these strategies focused heavily on the maritime domain. Nor should it come as surprise that a strong merchant fleet with a powerful Navy were seen by Imperial Japan and are seen by China as the *means* for implementing these strategies: a strong merchant fleet provides the flow of resources necessary for economic development, while a powerful navy is needed to protect sea lanes of communication to distant markets and support assertion of territorial claims. Then too, an aggressive maritime strategy emphasizing Mahan's concept of sea power was consistent with the military's growing assertiveness and steadily increasing nationalism in Imperial Japan in much the same way as it is in China today.

For both Japan and China, the economic backbone needed to support the development of a world-class merchant fleet and powerful Navy was provided by rapid economic growth and industrialization. While the precise amount of money that Beijing allocates each year is not clear, PLA modernization and force buildup are supported by a steadily growing military budget, in much the same way that the Imperial Japan's military buildup was supported by Tokyo. The scope of this force modernization and buildup notwithstanding, Imperial Japan did not wish to directly confront the United States and it appears that neither does China. Accordingly, development of a force capable of preemptive strike and asymmetric attack was and is integral to the operational implementation of both Imperial Japan's and China's strategies. For Japan, such asymmetric capabilities were provided by the development of the carrier air-power, long-range land-based naval strike aircraft, and the stand-off Long Lance torpedo. For China, these capabilities are provided by ballistic missiles, stand-off surface-to-surface missiles, stealthy conventional attack submarines, long range land-based strike aircraft and electronic attack and cyber warfare.

While there are many similarities between the maritime strategies developed by Imperial Japan and China, there are also clear differences. Imperial Japan's strategy emphasized the use of military force, both in pursuing the territory needed for "lebensraum" and in acquiring the precious resources needed for autarky. China – *at least to date* - has pursued its territorial claims and resources in a more measured fashion. China has minimized the use of force in the pursuit of its territorial objectives, primarily relying on a combination of aggressive diplomatic, propaganda, and legal actions. Moreover, Beijing has focused primarily on protecting economic resources with military

power, rather than seizing these resources. That said, Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force to assert these territorial claims and protect its economic interests – seizing the Paracel Islands in 1974, Spratley Islands in 1988 and Mischief Reef in 1995, and conducting missile exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1996.<sup>51</sup> These small-scale campaigns suggest that China will use military force when either its core interests are threatened or what is perceived as a relatively low-risk opportunity presents itself.

Moreover, Beijing has placed more emphasis on economic development than pre-war Tokyo – when viewed as a percentage of total government expenditures; the PLA's budget is only about a tenth of the Imperial Armed Forces budget. There is also a significant difference regarding how Imperial Japan approached the employment of sea power. Imperial Japan's strategy was focused on protection of the sea lanes of communication to resources from the Dutch East Indies, and the Navy had both the combat power and experience to execute such a mission. China's strategy is focused on sea lanes of communication that are global in scope, extending to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The PLA Navy does not yet have either the capacity or experience to conduct such sustained blue water operations; however that dynamic is changing as the Fleet participates in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and conducts extended out of area deployments.

Finally, the political and economic dynamics that drove Imperial Japan to war in 1941 are quite different from those that China faces today. Tokyo's decision to go to war was largely driven by a U.S. embargo on critical petroleum; while today China and the United States have an inter-dependent – albeit at times contentious – economic relationship. Indeed, China's high relative dependence on trade in general and the

collapse of formal colonialism as a viable political concept in today's global environment impose limits on Beijing's military options that were not imposed – at least theoretically – on Tokyo during the 1930's.

### Implications – Will History Repeat Itself?

The devastating consequences of the United States' war with Imperial Japan are well documented. The indicators of Japan's future aggression were clear as early as the mid-1930's, and yet went largely unanswered because the United States and other Western Powers were simply not prepared for a war.<sup>52</sup> Many of those indicators are present in the force modernization and buildup of China's military. China's military is growing in scope and capacity at an unprecedented pace and Beijing has become more and more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims within the East and South China Seas.<sup>53</sup> Nationalism in China is on the rise, and an increasingly confident and assertive PLA is playing a more and more important role in shaping Beijing's behavior.<sup>54</sup> While Cross-strait tensions have lessened in recent years, Beijing has not renounced the use of force against what leaders refer to as a "renegade province", and there are clear indications in PLA writings and other open source documents that the PLA is preparing for a potential conflict with the United States.<sup>55</sup>

The end state, ways, and means associated with Imperial Japan's and China's regional strategies are remarkably similar. While the comparison of these factors does not provide a crystal ball into the future, they do suggest that China is developing military capabilities at a scope and pace that make Beijing's strategic intent unclear. At best, such ambiguity creates the potential for miscalculation and increased regional tensions. At

worst, this ambiguity suggests that China may be on a path that will precipitate a war in the Pacific in much the same way as Imperial Japan nearly seven decades ago.

In view of this lack of clarity, prudence dictates that U.S. leaders take seriously the potential threat posed by China's maritime strategy. The United States still has an opportunity to learn from the past and respond to this threat *before* a crisis emerges, but the window for a decisive response is closing rapidly. While the purpose of this paper is not to provide a template for what such a response might be; clear communication of U.S. resolve *and capability* to defeat Chinese aggression is a critical imperative for deterring any potential military adventurism. Coalition building, survivable forward basing, and development of the capability to rapidly surge forces that can defeat anti-access strategies would be among the key enablers of such a message.

The consequences of failing to respond to the challenge presented by China's maritime strategy and naval modernization could prove to be profound. Should there be a conflict between China and the United States; the PLA is becoming increasingly capable of inflicting disproportionate losses on U.S. forces. Even if the United States were to deny Beijing's accomplishment of its campaign objectives in such a conflict, significant U.S losses could erode the confidence of regional partners and allies; and perhaps more important, erode the confidence of senior leaders in Washington. This erosion of confidence could lead to Washington's reluctance to commit to counter any follow-on Chinese aggression. In scenarios short of conflict, China's increasing maritime capability may reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrence in the region. In short, the long term implications of a U.S. failure to address the growing Chinese threat could be decreased regional stability and a reduction in U.S. influence throughout the Pacific Rim.

## Conclusion

No approach to forecasting is perfect and one can doubtless argue that past events are uncertain indicators of the future. Even if this point is ceded, few would argue that there is not much to be gained from looking to the past in an effort to better understand the future. This paper is based on the premise that certain trends in history are repetitive and has attempted to assess China's regional ambitions through the lens of Imperial Japan's strategy leading to World War II. Imperial Japan's strategy focused on territorial acquisition and safeguarding critical resources in much the same way that China's strategy does today. For both countries, Mahan's principals of sea power strongly influenced the development of a strategy supporting national development. With such a strategy comes the imperative of sea control through the development of a powerful naval force. There are of course, differences between the two strategies – China's approach is far more sophisticated, leveraging all of the elements of national power rather than just the military component and the political and economic factors that China faces today are much different than those faced by Imperial Japan. Moreover, China's Navy has not yet achieved either the capacity or experience attained by the Imperial Japanese Navy – *but that dynamic is changing rapidly.*

These similarities notwithstanding, it does not necessarily follow that China will precipitate another war in the Pacific as Imperial Japan did in 1940. What does follow is that many of the factors that led to the War in the Pacific are at play in China's execution of its regional strategy today. These factors suggest that leaders from the United States should take notice and act rather than passively waiting to see if cooperative engagement is successful in deterring Chinese adventurism. Prudence demands action now while there

remains a window of opportunity. This action must communicate U.S. resolve and capability to defeat any Chinese adventurism. The United States largely ignored the warning signs associated with Imperial Japan's aggression nearly seven decades ago. Today's leaders in Washington have opportunity to not make the same mistake twice. The stakes – security and stability in the Pacific Rim and continued U.S. global leadership - are far too high to merely *hope* that history does not repeat itself.

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<sup>5</sup> R. D. Kaplan, *How We Would Fight China*. (The Atlantic, June 2005) para 1. Retrieved 26 July 2009 at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan>.

<sup>6</sup> J. R. Holmes & T. Yoshihara. *China's Navy: A Turn to Corbett?* (Proceedings Magazine - Vol. 136/12, December 2010). Retrieved 9 March 2011 at <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-12/chinas-navy-turn-corbett>

<sup>7</sup> Van der Vat.

<sup>8</sup> Homes & Yoshihara.

<sup>9</sup> J. Nye. *How Will Hu-Obama Summit be Remembered?* (The Huffington Post, 20 January 2011). Retrieved 9 March 2011 at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/20/how-will-huobama-summit-b\\_n\\_811614.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/20/how-will-huobama-summit-b_n_811614.html)

<sup>10</sup> Van der Vat.

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<sup>12</sup> Van der Vat.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>16</sup> Van der Vat.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Morton.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid 54.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Van der Vat.

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- <sup>22</sup> Morton.
- <sup>23</sup> Van der Vat.
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- <sup>34</sup> Lai. Para 3.
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