The Fight to Get to the Fight: Deploying from a Contested Homeland

By Bruce Busler
The author adapted his original article, “Deploying from a Contested Homeland – The Fight to Get to the Fight,” for publication in the DTJ

Historically, deploying and sustaining military forces from the Continental United States (CONUS) enjoyed relative impunity from attacks on the homeland. But today, the U.S. military faces a new reality not encountered in previous conflicts. Over the last decade, the potential of near-peer conflict with China, or the acute threat from Russia, have become dominant in driving change in the character of war with the ability to disrupt and delay the nation’s ability to project power. Given that our adversaries’ goal is to gain time to achieve their objectives by delaying U.S. power projection, a sound deterrent and war-winning approach must be built on a demonstrable ability to fight through these adversary actions designed to disrupt force flow from the homeland.

The Department of Defense (DoD) must now anticipate the “fight to get to the fight.”

The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is assigned the warfighting task to deploy and sustain the Joint Force and overcome these adversary-imposed impediments. USTRANSCOM conducts this mission by leading collaborative planning efforts across a diverse set of military, commercial, and governmental partners in the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to achieve the desired end-to-end mobility effects. These critical partnerships and relationships gained through the JDDE provide USTRANSCOM access to fleets of military and commercial transportation providers for airlift sealift, along with road and rail movements over a set of networks and nodes comprised of civil highways, rail lines, seaports, airports, and operations centers.

An assessment of plausible enemy courses of action in a potential conflict with a near-peer adversary indicates both kinetic and non-kinetic threat activity are likely against U.S. power projection operations, with almost certainty that significant non-kinetic attacks will happen across a diverse and wide-ranging set of targets. These non-kinetic capabilities are further delineated as cyberspace operations, economic and other adverse pressures, and information operations. Defending against all possible attack vectors is not feasible; therefore, a reasonable contested environment mitigation strategy for large-scale deployment operations is to better understand resilience¹ and points of consequence² in our transportation networks. This approach is built on other proven constructs such as those espoused in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which offers well-developed approaches to remain secure and resilient by reducing vulnerabilities, minimizing consequences, identifying and disrupting threats, and hastening recovery.

Minimize – Maximize – Optimize

The following risk-managed approach applied to defense transportation provides specific opportunities to promote resilience and manage points of consequence in three primary areas for deploying and sustaining the Joint Force from the homeland: 

• Minimize the impact of high-probability and consequential cyber-threats on vulnerable elements of the JDDE.
• Maximize the ability to rapidly recover or execute alternate transportation solutions given the likelihood of node/network infrastructure degradation.
• Optimize relationships with critical transportation providers and leverage federal, state, and regional transportation agency interactions to rapidly support elevated levels of deployment activity when faced with the confounding aspect of disruptions.

While other areas might be addressed, USTRANSCOM’s ongoing assessments indicate these approaches provide a pragmatic framework to create resilience and manage consequence with high benefit for the Defense Transportation System.

Cyber Domain Vulnerabilities And Mitigations In The Homeland

USTRANSCOM’s focus on cyber domain mission assurance is a strategic priority, with considerable effort applied to military use of unclassified DoD Information Network (DODIN) for transportation operations. Commercial transportation partners are perceived as more vulnerable in cyberspace given the preponderance of activities occurring on unclassified networks. Significant daily and wartime contributions are gained from commercial airlift and sealift partners, along with other Transportation Service Providers (TSPs). These partners are so critical they are termed the “Fourth Component,” in addition to USTRANSCOM’s three component commands. Ultimately, USTRANSCOM’s risk is intimately linked to these commercial partners to the point that “their risk is USTRANSCOM’s risk,” prompting the need to raise the bar for cyberspace discipline as a key element in gaining resilience in our partnerships.

Since 2018, USTRANSCOM has contractually required commercial TSPs to submit annual self-assessments of National Institute of Standards (NIST) cybersecurity controls with significant improvements observed in recent years.³ Currently, self-assessments on the NIST controls are voluntary; however, under proposed rules for Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0, the future may require more stringent compliance. Additional measures beyond these contractual requirements address roles between government and industry as elements in multiple Executive Orders,⁴ which encourage industry to make ambitious investments in cybersecurity, and commit to improving information-sharing between the U.S. government and the private sector relating to cyber threat information, and those practices have been adopted with transportation industry partners. 

USTRANSCOM actively promotes federal assistance via the National Security Agency DoD Cyber Crimes Center (DC3) and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Participation is voluntary and confidential with benefits realized for those that choose to partake in the tools and services from these organizations at no cost. These cybersecurity measures elevate the cost and effort for Advanced Persistent Threat actors, with the expectation that the depth and duration of an inevitable cyber-attack will have reduced consequences and recovery to resume and continue military power projection operations will be accelerated.

Infrastructure Resilience To Support Contested Power Projection

While cyber-attack disruptions are the most likely and pervasive threat to power projection from the U.S. homeland, other threats or hazards may also create impacts necessitating a comprehensive mission assurance approach with a focus on transportation infrastructure. USTRANSCOM is designated to lead the DoD’s efforts to conduct assessments and identify transportation-related strategic risk issues, and the command performs this task through several designated programs. Three national defense programs mandate that the DoD work closely with the Department of Transportation (DOT), state and local agencies, and private sector transportation providers to address national defense needs in highways, railroads, and seaports. These programs define the minimum infrastructure requirements to conduct major power projection operations under wartime conditions using both civil and commercial capabilities:

• The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) comprises over 64,200 miles of interstate and connecting
  highways.
• The Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) incorporates 32,000 miles of privately owned rail lines and connectors that service 141 key military installations, defense sites and strategic seaports across the U.S.
• A Strategic Seaport Program with 18 commercial and six military ports, including two Military Ocean Terminals (MOTs), is designated to meet military movement needs, including sufficient standoff to conduct high net explosive weight (NEW) ammunition movements at the MOTs. Each designated strategic seaport has an approved Port Readiness Plan identifying the port facilities necessary to meet the largest anticipated military movement. DOT’s Maritime Administration (MARAD), in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and other interagency partners, monitors the readiness of the commercial seaports under the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN). Under contingency conditions, timely access to civil and commercial infrastructure is paramount and a rated order under the Transportation Priority Allocation System (TPAS)⁵ can prioritize necessary access if voluntary measures are insufficient.

Relationships with key transportation partners matter, and the time to develop and solidify those relationships is before they are tested. 

These national defense programs lay the foundation for accessing the necessary infrastructure for major deployment operations, which include assessments to ensure resiliency is inherent in these networks to deal with the inevitable disruptions expected in modern warfare. For seaports, the most recent USTRANSCOM congressional report in 2020 indicated most ports in the Strategic Seaport Program have no significant deficiencies and are fully capable of supporting DoD requirements as were connecting road and rail infrastructure. If a port has limitations for any reason, the DoD would use “in-lieu-of” infrastructure at the impacted port or shift to another strategic seaport given the robust footprint designed for each coastal region.

USTRANSCOM’s Army component, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), reinforces this approach with a “port diversification” practice to routinely shift movements across a range of ports to ensure they are ready and create a diverse pattern of operations that contributes to resiliency. The value in this approach is having tools to assess the impact on node and network degradation and developing courses of action to either recover or divert, which can be decisive in negating the consequence of potential port disruptions.

Relationships To Strengthen Situational Awareness And Responsiveness

The arduous time that will challenge the effectiveness of the JDDE will certainly be at the beginning of a major deployment in the homeland when national security is on the line. Relationships with key transportation partners matter, and the time to develop and solidify those relationships is before they are tested. USTRANSCOM has developed excellent working relationships at both the executive and operational levels with DoD’s transportation industry partners and government counterparts in every portion of the JDDE. The National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA) fosters multiple venues for beneficial exchanges across a range of committees with industry partners from airlift and sealift to surface, including seaports, rail, and trucking, as well as functional areas such as cyber security.

USTRANSCOM also hosts a recurring set of engagements through “Executive Working Groups (EWGs)” designed to allow frank and open dialogue on both classified and unclassified areas of mutual interest or concern for the timing and tempo of crisis or wartime operations. These are clearly differentiated from acquisition venues to avoid even the perception of constructive changes to contract terms, while providing the necessary basis of shared understanding. These EWG sessions are scheduled regularly throughout the year and embrace every industry sector to ensure robust dialogue and mutual trust sustain these critical relationships. During periods of greater intensity, these engagements increase to enhance situational awareness and posture for future operations. Recent global activity, such as the 2021 evacuee flow from Afghanistan, ongoing military aide for Ukraine, and support for Israel coupled with elevated threats to shipping in the Red Sea, all illustrate the power of these established and trusted relationships, allowing the JDDE to operate effectively even under duress.

General Jacqueline Van Ovost, Commander, USTRANSCOM, indicated that “DoD’s ability to project military forces is inextricably linked to
commercial industry.”

While USTRANSCOM’s relationship with the commercial transportation industry is exceptionally solid, there likely will be concerted efforts by adversaries in the early stages of a conflict to create confusion and sow seeds of doubt. In her 2023 congressional posture statement, General Jacqueline Van Ovost, Commander, USTRANSCOM, indicated that “DoD’s ability to project military forces is inextricably linked to commercial industry,” and the relationships built and sustained over many years provide the strong foundation that together, we will deliver even when adversaries contest our ability to operate.

Finally, an often-overlooked set of relationships essential for generating USTRANSCOM’s wartime output are linked to Reserve and National Guard units found in almost every aspect of the DoD’s mobility force structure. These Reserve Component forces are fully integrated into daily operations, with volunteerism being critical to providing non-mobilized capacity.

The homeland is no longer a sanctuary, so the entire enterprise must prepare for the inevitable when engaged in the process of deploying from the homeland.

Under crisis or wartime conditions, the ability to gain timely access to these forces is based on a series of national-level decisions. A key consideration for the USTRANSCOM commander is when and at what levels to ask for mobilization of mobility-enabling forces from the Secretary of Defense. Not only is this a major decision impacting the Reserve and Guard forces and their civilian employers, but it is also a signal to adversaries that the U.S. is gearing up for possible conflict. Thus, the final set of relationships that matter demands a firm exercise of the protocols and expectations at the national level of leadership for timely access to Reserve Component forces necessary to commence and maintain large-scale deployment operations from the homeland.

Minimize – Maximize – Optimize. Repeat.

The homeland is no longer a sanctuary, so the entire enterprise must prepare for the inevitable when engaged in the process of deploying from a contested homeland. The DoD must now embrace a diverse set of activities, along with civil and commercial partners, to bolster resilience and manage points of consequence. USTRANSCOM’s approach to this reality is to deter adversaries who might believe they can cripple the U.S. at the starting gate by taking the following actions:

• Minimize the impact of high-probability cyber-threat actions on vulnerable elements of the JDDE, with a concentration on commercial transportation providers.
• Maximize the ability to maintain alternate transportation solutions across degraded  node/network paths, no matter how the disruption occurs.
• Optimize the contributions of critical transportation providers directly and through relationships established with NDTA, along with federal, state, and regional transportation agencies to withstand the friction of modern conflict.

By embracing this approach, the USTRANSCOM motto “Together, We Deliver” is more than a tag line. It becomes the fulfillment of a promise that will allow the JDDE to be successful when we must “fight to get to the fight.” DTJ

About the Author

Bruce Busler retired in May 2024 as the director of both the USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center and the SDDC Transportation Engineering Agency at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. He is a life member of NDTA.