Defending the Army Organic Industrial Base from Threats: Including Small, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)

By COL Christopher J. Masson, USA

World Wars I and II demonstrated that the homeland and the defense industrial base (DIB) are vulnerable to attacks. During these wars, German U-boats targeted shipping routes, disrupting the resupply of defense products to the European Theater of War. The DIB encompasses a vast workforce and infrastructure essential for producing and innovating defense capabilities, including government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO), and privately owned factories, foundries, ports, shipyards, ammunition plants, and public or private research universities.

Today, the modern equivalent of the U-boat threat is the asymmetric challenge that small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) pose to the DIB, and the U.S. Army’s organic industrial base (OIB), a critical component of the DIB.

This paper examines the strategic importance of the DIB and the Army OIB, explains the threats presented by sUAS, and highlights why both must be protected. Finally, it outlines the Army’s role in determining requirements, improving capabilities, establishing authorities, and clarifying responsibilities to effectively counter sUAS threats and safeguard the OIB within the United States.¹

In WWI and WWII, like today, the United States homeland was presumed to be a sanctuary. But attacks from German U-boats proved that the U.S. was vulnerable, leading to an initially struggling response that took time to improve the security of the homeland’s littorals. In 1918, Germany conducted the first large-scale attacks on U.S. home waters, sinking or damaging 23 ships off New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, and even shelling Cape Hatteras, N.C., causing public alarm.²

In WWII, Germany launched Operation Paukenschlag (“Drumbeat”) in January 1942. U-boats operated within sight of U.S. shores, sinking merchant ships visible from beaches off Long Island, Cape Hatteras, and Florida. German U-boats torpedoed vessels close to harbors like New York, Norfolk, and Jacksonville, threatening port operations by sinking ships in approaches and anchorages.³

In the first six months of 1942, U-boats sank around 400 ships in American waters, totaling more than 2 million tons of shipping losses — a period German sailors called the “Second Happy Time.”⁴

In both cases, Germany’s objective was to disrupt troop and supply shipping to Europe and generate psychological shock. While the campaigns never strangled U.S. ports, they forced the rapid expansion of convoys, coastal defenses, and anti-submarine patrols.⁵ The modern version of the U-boat threat is the asymmetrical challenge that sUAS) pose to the DIB and the U.S. Army OIB, as part of the DIB. This paper assesses the strategic importance of the Army OIB and why it must be protected. It outlines sUAS threats, focusing on their size and capabilities. Lastly, it outlines the Army’s role in determining requirements, improving capabilities, establishing authorities, and clarifying responsibilities to effectively address sUAS threats and protect the OIB within the United States.

The DIB and Army OIB Enable Combat Power Projection and Resupply

The Army OIB is part of the DIB and includes a vast workforce of people, combined with the associated infrastructure required to produce and innovate defense items. Industrial base facilities can be government-owned and government-operated (GOGO), contractor-owned and contractor-operated (COCO), GOCO, privately owned factories, foundries, shipyards, and ammunition plants, and government, public, or private research universities.⁷

The Army OIB manufactures, resets, and maintains Army equipment; this enables the Army to deliver critical materiel and sustainment support to warfighters at the point of need. The Army’s OIB consists of depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants.⁸

For example, Red River Army Depot (RRAD) in New Boston, Texas, occupies 15,375 acres, houses over 1,400 buildings, and can rebuild a large variety of vehicle systems and components for the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. Safeguarding this depot is crucial to the Army and joint force. Vulnerabilities for moving combat power to the point of need are U.S. seaports on the littorals. Ports, such the Port of Beaumont in Texas, are vital partners for the U.S. joint force. There is no practical way to move the required quantity of military platforms via air to a war theater; shipping lanes are essential in building combat power and resupplying the theater.

Small UAS Can Be Employed for Surveillance, Sabotage, or Direct Attacks

The Department of War and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) define sUAS as small, unmanned aircraft systems weighing less than 55 pounds. The FAA allows most routine recreational sUAS operations to occur without requiring airworthiness certification so long as the platform is operating in the visual line of sight, where the operator can see the system without obstruction and operate safely.¹⁰

All sUAS need to be registered, and there is a set of rules which operators must follow; these can be found on the FAA’s DroneZone website.¹¹ Congress created a “carve-out” exception to allow drone operators to fly sUAS under 55 pounds for personal enjoyment without complying with Part 107 — Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).¹² The Air Force Materiel Command published the Air Force Small-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Guide & Reporting Procedures; a portion of this document provides an overview of sUAS types.¹³

There are over 8,000 sUAS flown within the U.S. on any given day, and over one million drones of assorted sizes registered with the FAA.¹⁴ The majority are flown legally and not a threat to national security. But adversaries can employ sUAS for surveillance, sabotage, or direct attacks on critical infrastructure, posing significant risks to the operational readiness and resilience of the DIB and Army’s OIB.

Innovations in combat are shifting rapidly, as demonstrated in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Small UAS are low-cost, low-budget, and easily operated. They can move quickly through airspace, and the launch origin is hard to locate. The most dangerous scenario is employing an sUAS after attaching a munition or chemical agent payload for a kinetic attack. Employing an sUAS with a payload could physically damage DIB and OIB facilities and reduce the capacity to resupply military formations in conflict. Deterrence is complicated, and it requires coordination and cooperation across the federal interagency and with state and local governments. Acting now will ensure the U.S. is better prepared than the government response in WWI and WWII.

The Army Must Be a Proactive Partner in Codifying Authorities, Validating Responsibilities, Understanding Requirements, and Improving Capabilities to Counter sUAS Threats.

During WWI and WWII, assuming the continental U.S. was safe led to poor preparation and a disorganized early response — an error we must avoid when addressing sUAS threats today. By mid-1942, the U.S. instituted coastal convoys, air patrols, radar, sonar, and escorts, which drastically reduced successful attacks. Ports, such as New York and Norfolk, were soon fortified with nets, minefields, and patrol crafts to prevent incursions.¹⁵ Government efforts had to synchronize authorities and responsibilities from the local to the federal level.

The Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) was originally led by Department of War efforts to align counter-sUAS authorities and responsibilities. To enhance efficiency, on August 27, 2025, the Department “…direct[ed] the Secretary of the Army to disestablish the JCO and establish Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) reporting to the Deputy Secretary [of War].”¹⁶

 

The purpose of JIATF 401 is to better align authorities and resources to rapidly deliver Joint C-sUAS capabilities, defeat adversary threats, and promote sovereignty over national airspace.¹⁷ JIATF 401 will become the linchpin for determining how the joint services protect DIB facilities from sUAS.

COUNTER Act 1793

Another positive step is Congressional legislation geared towards protecting U.S. assets from incursions via UAS. This Act is cited as the “Comprehensive Operations for Unmanned-System Neutralization and Threat Elimination Response Act,” also known as the “COUNTER Act” 1793 — 119th Congress (2025-2026).¹⁸ Its origin was driven by events in New Jersey in November 2024, where drones (sUAS) were spotted over Picatinny Arsenal.¹⁹

COUNTER Act 1793 will enhance the “protection of the buildings, grounds, and property to which the public is not permitted regular, unrestricted access and that are under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the Department.”²⁰ It aims to expand the Department’s authority to neutralize unauthorized drones and it codifies the Secretary’s delegation authority to take required actions and further delegate responsibilities.²¹ This is complementary to the establishment of JIATF 401. Developing effective first-level responses to sUAS kinetic attacks requires further progress in processes, resources, and technology. One way is through Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Currently, most counter-UAS systems rely on operators who manually respond. “This information glut not only complicates operator interactions but also slows down accurate decision-making, especially when facing sUAS swarm threats.”²² In large-scale combat, drone swarms would be the most dangerous threat. Small UAS swarms are synchronized and coordinated groups of drones that work in concert to overwhelm a target.²³ It is harder to neutralize the entire swarm, and at least a portion of the attacking platforms are likely to reach their destination with a payload.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The joint force, through JIATF 401, should focus research and development towards “AI, automation, and advanced algorithms”²⁴ to more effectively counter-UAS platforms and respond smartly with technology at installations, rather than relying on countermeasures like ‘dronebusters’ or small arms. These last-line defenses, as part of a layered approach, are important but not ideal.

Ensuring Industrial Base Resilience and Joint Readiness Against sUAS Threats

The global security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The U.S. homeland is not immune to kinetic and non-kinetic attacks from rogue actors, terrorists, and peer-adversaries. One low-cost, high-yield method to limit force projection capabilities and reduce resupply to a deployed force is to adversely impact the DIB and the Army OIB within it, through sUAS attacks.

Attacks on the homeland reduce war­fighting strength, limit force projection via ports, and cripple manufacturing facilities, which cannot be repaired or rebuilt quickly. The Army, as part of the Joint force, needs to be a vital participant on the path forward to enhance U.S. effectiveness to counter sUAS threats; JIATF 401 is the primary way for the Army to understand requirements, improve capabilities, codify authorities, and validate responsibilities to more effectively counter sUAS threats within the U.S. to protect the Army OIB and the larger DIB.

The Joint force must bring DIB facilities and partners to the table and assess threats at each location, including depots, arsenals, ammunition plants, and ports.

 

Second, the Army and Joint force should follow legislative movement on the COUNTER Act 1793 and analyze the Act’s impact on JIATF 401 Interagency collaboration and synchronization. It is imperative that Services develop the right capabilities to gain tactical advantage and technological superiority. These advantages include assessing AI and its applications to counter sUAS threats with systems, algorithms, and robotics, and relying less on manual counter-threat operators.

If the Services continue working collaboratively within JIATF 401, leverage advancements in technology, refine authorities and responsibilities, and consider DIB facilities’ inputs and threat assessments, they will be resourcing DIB facilities with the proper materiel, systems, and training to effectively respond to sUAS incursions and ultimately, securing the DIB within the continental U.S. to effectively project combat power and resupply the Joint force during large-scale combat operations. DTJ

References for DEFENDING THE ARMY OIB

1. Port of Beaumont webpage and news-media subpage, located at https://www.pobtx.com/news-and-media

2. Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 413–15.

3. Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 3–22.

4. Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939–1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), 465–510.

5. Michael L. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985), 21–28.

6. Photograph resides in the U.S. Library of Congress and originated via the US Navy, Photographed from a Naval Air Station Key West aircraft; U.S. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs division and at this link: https://loc.gov/pictures/resource/fsa.8e01531/. The U.S. Boiler Pennsylvania Sun was saved and returned to service in 1943.

7. Maiya Clark, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Past Strength, Current Challenges, and Needed Change, January 24, 2024 (The Heritage Foundation), 2.

8. U.S. Army Materiel Command, Stand-To! Online, March 25, 2022 (https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2022/03/25/).

9. Red River Army Depot, government webpage (https://redriver.army.mil/rradsite/pages/aboutrrad.html).

10. Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), August 7, 2025, FAA National Headquarters (FOB−10B), Mission Support Services Policy (AJV-P), United States Department of Transportation.

11. Federal Aviation Administration, DroneZone government website (https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#/).

12. Code of Federal Regulations, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-F/part-107, September 9, 2025.

13. United States Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Identification and Reporting Guide for sUAS, (https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/14/2002956012/-1/-1/1/SUAS IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING GUIDE.PDF/SUAS IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING GUIDE.PDF), March 14, 2022.

14. Major General Pat Ryder, On-the-Record Press Briefing, Pentagon Press Secretary, (https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4005839/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-an-off-camera-on-the-record-pr/), December 16, 2024.

15. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939–May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), 183–200.

16. Secretary Pete B. Hegseth, Establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force 401, Memorandum for Senior Pentagon Leadership, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Defense Agency and DoW Field Activity Directors, August 27, 2025, 1.

17. Secretary Pete B. Hegseth, August 27, 2025, 1.

18. US Congress Bill Tracker, government website, (https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/119/s1793/text).

19. Howard Altman, FAA Insider Opens Up About Drone Incursions Over Military Bases, August 15, 2025.

20. U.S. Congress Bill Tracker, (https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/119/s1793/text).

21. U.S. Congress Bill Tracker, (https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/119/s1793/text).

22. Dr. Jason Adaska, “Small UAS Swarms and Battle Management: The Evolving Warfare Landscape,” September 10, 2024.

23. Adaska, September 10, 2024.

24. Adaska, September 10, 2024.

25. Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) Operational Combined Victory (Training and Validation Exercise), Camp Indiantown Gap, Indiana, and Muscatatuck Training Center, Indiana, February 2025.

About the Author

Colonel Christopher J. Masson, U.S. Army, is an Army War College (AWC) Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin, for the 2025-2026 academic year. After AWC, he will command Red River Army Depot in New Boston, Texas, from Summer 2026-2028.